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Abstract
We study the effect of legally irrelevant events on the sentencing outcomes of around
2,500 individual defendants, heard before the People’s Court in Nazi Germany. Our
analysis exploits exogeneous variation in battle deaths and estimates their effect on
the likelihood of receiving the death penalty. According to our results, higher German
fatalities on the battlefield systematically increased the chances of receiving the death
penalty. We show that decisions by experienced judges were less affected by battle
deaths, while judges who were more ideologically committed to the regime were more
likely to impose the death penalty in response to hearing news of higher German
fatalities. Our results are not driven by particular types of offenses or defendants, time
periods, or changes in arrest patterns and are robust to the use of major bombing raids
of German cities instead of battle deaths. We also find some evidence that victories of
the German national soccer team decreased the chances of capital punishment.
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1 Introduction
Justitia, the Roman goddess of justice, is often depicted as a blindfolded woman holding a
scale and a sword in her hands. The blindfold represents the idea that judicial decisions
should be made in an objective and impartial manner and be free from emotions.
However, the decisions of actual judges often deviate from those ideals and even small
factors such as the timing of a trial’s meal breaks (Danzinger et al. 2011) can have a system-
atic impact on sentencing decisions. Recent literature at the cross-roads between economics
and psychology highlights that the decisions of individuals are often heavily influenced by
one’s emotional state of mind at the actual time of decision making (e.g. Laibson 1997, Bor-
dalo et al. 2013). This can lead to suboptimal intertemporal decisions, even in the context
of important, and high-stakes, environments (Busse et al. 2015). In the context of judicial
decision making, this means that the emotional state of the judges could literally be the
difference between life and death for the defendant.
In this paper we, therefore, address the broad research question: Do legally irrelevant
factors that can influence the judges’ emotional state at the time of decision, impact the
outcome of court cases? We also ask whether the degree to which extraneous factors influence
case outcomes depends on the judges’ experience and ideology. To do so, we examine the
extent to which battle deaths incurred by the Wehrmacht in World War II (WWII) influenced
whether defendants tried for treason and high treason were convicted, and sentenced to death,
in the People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof ).1 We find that the number of battle deaths suffered
in the period immediately prior to the sentence being handed down is a strong predictor of
1The crime of treason concerns itself with acts which harm the state externally (as opposed to high
treason which has an internal focus), such as espionage and giving support to the enemy in times of war. In
practice, though, the charge of treason was overwhelmingly applied by default to communist and many other
left-wing resisters, since the Nazi regime automatically assumed that they must have been working directly,
by definition, for Moscow. In the vast majority of instances, however, this was not the case. In those rare
examples where military-related information was actually passed on to the Allies, it is important to note
that it was typically not of a nature to influence the outcomes of on-going operations in the field. In short,
the activities of those charged with high treason and treason were for all intents and purposes unrelated to
the battle performance or monthly casualty numbers. We also conduct a robustness test that excludes all
cases on subversion of the armed forces from our sample.
2
whether a defendant charged with treason or high treason was convicted and sentenced to
death. The results are generally robust up to three months before the sentence was handed
down, with the size effects being strongest with a two-month lag. We also find that not all
judges were equally likely to be influenced by battle deaths. In particular, the effect of battle
deaths on sentencing is very small for judges who had previously served in the judiciary in
the Weimar Republic, suggesting that judicial experience made judges less susceptible to
being influenced by battle deaths. Judges who were more ideologically committed to Nazism
were more inclined to be influenced by battle deaths than their less-ideological brethren. We
further show that defendants who were members of the Communist Party were more likely to
be sentenced to death than non-communists in the months following increased battle losses.
There are a number of potential concerns regarding our identification strategy and in-
terpretation of the results: First, the number of cases dealing with espionage and giving
support to the enemy could increase during times of intensive fighting and increased battle-
deaths. To address, this concern we perform robustness checks that exclude all trials for a
particular type of offense (for example, subversion of the armed forces) or type of defendant
(military or left-wing political cadre). We show that our results are not driven by those
trials and, in fact, the estimated coefficient hardly changes in magnitude. We also show
that potential changes in arrest patterns following increased battle deaths or bombing raids
do not drive our results. Second, one may be concerned that if judges are sentencing more
people to death following increased battle deaths that they are simply reflecting the will of
the people. To address this concern, in a further robustness check, we investigate whether
the effect of battle deaths on court rulings differs depending on the ideological commitment
of the population to Nazi values in the defendant’s Kreis. The results suggest that the effect
of battle deaths on sentencing outcomes is likely to be driven through their impact on the
judges’ mood rather than through their impact on the sentiment of the people.
In addition to considering the effect of battle deaths on case outcomes in the People’s
Court, we also consider outcomes of two other, exogenous series of events that are likely to
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have affected the mood of the judges, but which were irrelevant to the legal merits of the
case being heard: namely, major allied bombing raids and the outcome of football matches
played by the German national team during the period of the Third Reich. As discussed by
Waldinger (2016), allied bombing raids represented an exogenous shock that had a strong
adverse effect on civilian morale. The outcomes of sporting events have previously been
shown to influence election results (Healey et al., 2010; Miller, 2013). In Nazi Germany, the
performance of the national football team was considered a matter of national pride. As
such, one could expect major allied bombing raids and success in football matches to evoke
strong emotion in the judges that might influence whether the death sentence were to be
imposed. We find that an increase in the prevalence of major allied bombing raids increases
the likelihood that the death sentence was imposed in cases in which sentences were handed
down two months after the bombing raid. Similarly, we find that when the national football
team wins, judges were less likely to sentence defendants to death in cases in which the
sentence was handed down two months after the conclusion of the match.
Our results speak to the debate between advocates of legal formalism and legal realism as
to whether the outcome of judicial rulings depend solely on application of the relevant laws
to the facts. Legal formalists hold that judges decide cases solely through the application
of the law to the facts and are not influenced by legally irrelevant situational considerations
(Weinrib, 1988). The legal realist movement, on the other hand, claim that judicial rulings
depend on the political or social context in which the decision is made (Posner, 1986).
While legal formalists maintain that extraneous factors are irrelevant, legal realists posit that
judicial decisions are not made in a vacuum and can be influenced by non-legal considerations.
Our results are important because most would expect that in a “fair and just” criminal
trial whether one is convicted, and the sentence one receives, should depend on the appli-
cation of the law to the facts. It is one thing, as legal realists contend, for judges to draw
on their life experiences when deciding how to apply the law to the facts. However, it is
quite another, for the outcome of a case to depend on specific recurring events external to
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the court room, which could not possibly have any bearing on the guilt, or otherwise, of the
defendant in the case. Evidence that this occurs brings into question the soundness of the
administration of justice. While our results are for an historical court, they potentially have
implications for modern judicial decision-making. There is evidence, for instance, that the
threat of terrorism has had an effect on sentencing disparities in Israeli courts (Shayo and
Zussman, 2011) and that following 9/11 certain ethnic minorities received longer sentences
in courts in the United States (McConnell, 2009).
Previous studies have shown that legally irrelevant situational determinants can influence
the outcome of cases. Danzinger et al. (2011) have demonstrated that the timing of a meal
break can influence the outcome of a case; Shayo and Zussman (2011) that the outcome
of a case is influenced by the intensity of terrorism in the vicinity of the courtroom in the
year preceding the ruling; and Lim et al. (2015) that newspaper coverage of a case can
influence the sentence length that U.S. state nonpartisan elected judges impose for violent
crimes. Beyond the court room, previous studies have revealed that information irrelevant
to government performance can influence election outcomes. Healy et al. (2010) show that
in the U.S., the outcome of local football games in the 10 days prior to the election influence
the outcome of gubernational, Senate and Presidential election outcomes. Miller (2013) finds
that professional sports outcomes predict Mayoral elections in the U.S. Bagues and Esteve-
Volart (2011) provide evidence that election outcomes in Spain are influenced by who wins
in the Spanish Christmas Lottery, a lottery held every Christmas, in which 75 per cent of
people participate and ticket sales amount to 0.3 per cent of Spanish GDP.
We extend this limited literature that has examined the role of extraneous factors on
legal decision-making and voting intentions in elections to examine the impact of legally
irrelevant factors - battle deaths, major allied bombing raids and football matches involving
the national team - on judicial decision-making during wartime. The People’s Court is
an ideal setting to examine the effect of major allied bombing raids and battle deaths on
sentencing outcomes, given that defendants were charged with political offenses against the
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state. In wartime, increased battle losses, major allied bombing raids and acts of high
treason and treason represent an increased threat to the state. Hence, it is conceivable that
the emotion evoked by hearing of growing battle losses or the destruction wrought by major
allied bombing raids, over which the judge has no control, will influence the sentencing he
imposes on those convicted of treason or high treason, something which the judge can control.
Psychologists have established that emotions experienced in one domain can have an
effect on decision-making in another domain (Forgas et al., 2005; Schwartz and Clore, 1983).
Specifically, events in one domain influence one’s state of mind or mood that unconsciously
affect evaluation in other domains (Miller, 2013; Schwartz and Clore, 1983). One might
expect this to be particularly true when strong emotion, such as that generated by wartime
battle casualties or destruction from bombing raids, is evoked in one domain and, in the other
domain in which a judgment is being made, those charged with treason and high treason
are considered to be Volksfeinde (public enemies) opposed to the state, although, of course,
they cannot be directly responsible for losses on the battle front or destruction due to major
allied bombing raids. Overall, our results are consistent with a story in which bad news from
the front impacts negatively on the mood of the judges, affecting sentencing outcomes.
Our findings contribute to recent studies that use data from Nazi Germany to better
understand economic, legal or social processes (see, for example, Akbulut-Yuksel and Yuk-
sel, 2015; Ferguson and Voth, 2008; Satyanath et al. 2017; Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2015;
Waldinger, 2016). More specifically, our findings add to studies that have sought to better
understand different aspects of decision-making on the People’s Court (Gruchmann, 1988;
Marxen, 1994; Schlu¨ter, 1995), the closest of which to our study are Geerling et al. (2016,
2017). Geerling et al. (2016) examine how the sentence imposed on those convicted of treason
and high treason varied with the characteristics of the defendant and the defendant’s prior
criminal history. Geerling et al. (2017) examine the effect of the ideological commitment
of the judge to Nazism on the likelihood that those convicted of treason and high treason
in the People’s Court were sentenced to death. Our study, though, differs from Geerling et
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al. (2016, 2017) in that the research question is quite different. Specifically, neither of these
studies considered the relevance of extraneous factors on decision-making.
2 The Context
Our sample consists of individuals charged with treason or high treason who appeared before
the People’s Court in Nazi Germany during WWII. The People’s Court was established by
the Nazis in April 1934 to hear charges of treason and high treason. Commensurate with
the establishment of the People’s Court, the Nazis enacted the Law Amending Provisions of
Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure to amend Articles 80-92 of the Reichsstrafgesetzbuch
(State Penal Code), which was first promulgated in 1871 and defined the scope of acts that
constituted high treason and treason. The effect of the amendment to the criminal law
was to considerably increase the range of activities that internally (externally) undermined
the state that were regarded as high treason (treason). Sentences for defendants convicted
of treason and high treason varied considerably from incarceration of differing lengths in a
regular prison or penitentiary (hard labor, without civil rights) up to, and including, the
death sentence. The State Penal Code contained no clear guidelines as to which sentence
should be imposed in which circumstances, which meant that all the judges on the People’s
Court had enormous discretion in deciding what sentence to impose.
Each case was heard before a presiding judge and four lay members of the Court, drawn
from the Nazi Party to provide “political expertise” (Zarusky and Mehringer, 1998; Gruch-
mann, 1998). The lay members of the Court sat in a purely advisory role and it was the
presiding judge who decided on guilt and what sentence to impose and provided the written
reasons for the decision. Hence, for all practical purposes decisions of the People’s Court
were decisions of a single judge. There was no right of appeal (Ko¨ch 1989; Marxen 1994;
Zarusky, 2011).
The People’s Court was divided into senates. Initially, there were three senates, but a
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fourth senate was added in November 1935, a fifth senate in November 1941 and a sixth
senate in December 1942. Each of the senates heard cases against defendants charged with
treason or high treason or both. There was some regional specialization within senates.
For example, toward the end of World War II, senate 4 heard cases against Germans from
Lorraine, senate 5 heard cases arising in parts of Austria and Senate 6 heard separatist cases
in Bavaria and the Alpine regions (Gaue) of Austria. For most of its history, senates 1 and
2 were the only generalist senates empowered to hear cases against defendants charged with
both high treason and treason. As most defendants charged with treason were also charged
with high treason, this meant that most defendants were tried in senates 1 and 2 (Wagner,
1974). For the most part, there was no a priori reason to expect that defendants with specific
characteristics (for example, catholics, communists or those of partial Jewish ancestry) would
be tried in one senate or another. A possible exception is senate 3 which, toward the end of
World War II, heard, inter alia, cases of treason in favour of the Soviet Union. One might
expect senate 3 to have heard a disproportionate number of cases involving defendants who
were communist. But, there are very few cases in the sample from senate 3. Overall just
under three quarters of the cases in our sample were heard in senates 1 and 2. Most of the
remaining cases were heard in senates 5 and 6, with about 1.2 per cent of cases heard in
senates 3 and 4.
As discussed in Geerling et al. (2017) the types of cases which each senate heard con-
stantly changed over time. In some instances, in the space of a few years, judges would be
(re)assigned to several different senates. This meant that judges heard a variety of trea-
son and high treason cases against defendants with a range of characteristics When Roland
Friesler became President of the Court in August 1942 he transferred high profile cases, and
cases in which there was uncertainty as to jurisdiction to his senate (senate 1) or senate 2,
which further muddied jurisdictional differences between senates (Wagner, 1974; Wieland,
1989). Koch (1989, p. 229) suggests that the division of jurisdiction between the various
senates was not always clearly defined, and especially under Thierack and Freisler the dis-
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tinctions were blurred. Wagner (1974, p. 26) reaches the same conclusion, writing: the
multiplication of senates, the constant growth in the number of cases, the fact that partic-
ular cases involved both high treason and treason, as well as the Freisler type of leadership
brought with it an ever stronger blurring of jurisdiction within the individual senates.
All of the judges on the Court were male and all, but one, belonged to the Nazi Party or
one of its ancillary organizations. In order to examine whether ideologically more committed
judges are more prone to take account of legally irrelevant factors, we need some way to
differentiate the judges on the basis of their ideological commitment to Nazism. To do so,
following Geerling et al. (2017) we use a binary variable set equal to 1 if the judge joined
the Nazi Party before the Nazis came to power in January 1933. Hereafter, these pre-1933
judges will be referred to by the German term for early members of the Nazi party, the
Alte Ka¨mpfer (old fighters). We assume here that the Alte Ka¨mpfer held personal views
that were strongly aligned to the values of the Nazi Party. To ascertain whether more
experienced career-judges were less likely to be influenced by bad news from the front, we
need a proxy for judicial experience. We use a binary variable set equal to 1 if the judge
served on the Bench in the Weimar Republic. To examine if communists were more likely
to be sentenced to death following receipt of bad news from the front we employ a binary
variable set to 1 if the defendant was a member of either the Communist Party of Germany
or Austria (KPD/KPO¨). We also control for the judges’ age and religion, as well as a number
of demographic and human capital characteristics of the defendant.
3 Data
The data on case and defendant characteristics are taken from the official state records
of cases tried before the People’s Court and Supreme Court collected by the Resistance as
High Treason (Widerstand als Hochverrat) project. These were complied from West German
archives and previously inaccessible files from the East Europe. In total, the collection
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contains in excess of 70,000 pages of court files that record the judicial prosecution of more
than 6,000 men and women charged with high treason and treason who appeared before
the central courts of the Third Reich, 1933-1945 (Zarusky and Mehringer 1998). It includes
a wealth of information on the indictment, investigation, judgment and sentencing of each
defendant. From these records, we are able to reconstruct the profiles and establish the
sentences of those convicted of treason or high treason. Wherever possible, we have verified
our information against the entries for individual resisters found in the leading encyclopaedias
of German resistance (Steinbach and Tuchel, 1998, 2004).
This study focuses on cases where resistance took place within the territorial boundaries
of Germany following the Anschluss (union) with Austria in March 1938. We identified
1,334 cases presided over by thirty-five judges, involving 4,177 defendants. Twenty-seven
of the thirty-five judges served in the People’s Court; the other eight served exclusively in
the Supreme Court. To measure a judges’ ideological commitment to Nazism, we needed
to find more detailed information about their background and career. The Bundesarchiv
(Federal Archive) in Berlin contains Personalakten (personal files) of judges who served on
the Supreme Court and People’s Court, as well as Nazi Party membership records which
survived the war. We located personal files for 26 of the 35 judges (21 of the 27 judges
from the People’s Court) and supplemented this knowledge with legal encyclopaedias from
the Third Reich (Klee, 2003). These files provided additional information on the judges’
age, whether they had served on the bench during the Weimar Republic, joined the Nazi
Party (if so, their date of admission), and were brought up as a Roman Catholic. This
exercise provided information on 26 judges who presided over 1,157 cases involving 3,579
defendants; that is, more than 85 per cent of all defendants charged with treason and high
treason for activities carried out within Germany and Austria. Given that the focus of this
study is on the effect of war related events on trial outcomes, we limit our sample to the
period covered by WWII. Hence, for these analyses, our sample only includes cases where
defendants were sentenced in the period 1 September 1939 until 6 April 1945 (the day the
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last sentence of the People’s Court was handed down). For most specifications this involved
2,430 defendants who were charged with treason or high treason for activities carried out in
Austria or Germany.
Figure 1 graphs the number of monthly death sentences (line) and monthly German
military fatalities (bars) during the period of observation. Throughout the sample period,
there was at least one court decision each month with an average of around 38 decisions per
month. Out of the 64 months in the sample, there were only 14 months without any death
sentences. On average, there were around 17 trials resulting in a death sentence each month
with the peak of 60 death sentences in September 1942.2
The fraction of death sentences among court rulings was relatively high. In over 42% of
the trials, the defendants were sentenced to death (see Table 1).
Table 1 about here
Our main measure for outside events are monthly German military casualties.3 To mea-
sure battle losses, we take the natural log of the absolute number of battle deaths in a given
month. The data on battle losses is sourced from German military historian, Ru¨diger Over-
mans, whose study Deutsche milita¨rische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg (German Military
Casualties in the Second World War), provided a reassessment of German military war dead
based on a statistical survey of German military personnel records (Overmans, 2000).
The bars in Figure 1 depict the monthly German military fatalities over the sample
period. There are a few peaks in the early period of the war, which are the result of
the attack on Poland (September 1939), operation Weseru¨bung (Invasion of Denmark and
Norway in April - June 1940) as well as the invasion of France (May - June 1940). The
2One explanation for this peak is that in May 1942, the Ministry of Justice, in collaboration with Thierack
and the Chief Public Prosecutor decided that communist high treason possessed the character of treason;
therefore it should be regularly punished with death (Wagner, 1974 p. 804)
3In addition to monthly casualties, we also collected data on individual battles that involved both Ger-
many and their major allies (Japan and Italy). Using a number of battle victories and defeats instead, we
find that German defeats increase the likelihood of death sentence. However, the estimated coefficient is not
statistically significant at conventional levels.
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Figure 1: Total Number of People’s Court Death Sentences and German Battle Fatalities
between 1939 and 1945
Notes: The red line shows the monthly number of People’s Court trials that resulted in a death sentence.
The blue bars display the monthly German military fatalities during the period September 1939 until March
1945.
12
monthly casualties start to vastly increase from June 1941 onward with the invasion of the
Soviet Union. The period 12/1942 to 2/1943, alone, saw a total of around 330,000 casualties
mainly from the Battle of Stalingrad. From June 1944 onward the average amount of monthly
casualties exceeds 200,000. The summary statistics in Table 1 show that the average number
of monthly casualties is around 92,000. There are two months without any recorded military
casualties (December 1939 and February 1940). The month with the largest number of
German fatalities in our sample is August 1944.
The paper also considers the impact of the Allied air campaign and the performance of
the national football team on sentencing. To measure major allied bombing raids, we only
include those which inflicted the greatest damage to German industry and infrastructure,
as determined by fatalities, and had the most profound psychological shock on the regime
(Keegan, 1989). There were six such major bombing raids: namely, Berlin (25 August, 1940),
Cologne (30-31 May 1942), Bremen (25-26 June 1942), Moehne dam (16-17 May 1943),
Hamburg (24 July-2 August 1943) and Dresden (13-14 February 1945). As for the German
national football team, it played 104 matches while the Nazis were in power, including
matches in the Berlin Olympics, World Cup and World Cup qualifiers and international
friendlies. The last such match was played on 22 November 1942. The Rec. Sport Soccer
Statistics Foundation has details of all 104 matches including dates, opponents, venues and
outcomes (RSSSF, 2016).
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Empirical Strategy
Our unit of analysis is at the court case level i. We analyse the effect of German battle deaths
in month t on the judge’s decision to apply the death penalty by specifying an econometric
equation of the following general form:
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deathit = α + λt + T + ϕBit−τ + Xiγ + νit, (1)
where α is a constant, λt is a vector of month-of-the-year specific dummy variables, T
is a linear time trend, and B is the (natural log of) German battle deaths in month t. t
denotes the month of the trial. X is a vector of case-specific covariates.
Given that we have no theory to guide us about the timing of the effect (How long does
it take for the news from the front to arrive in Germany?) we estimate equation 1 using
different lags of B, indicated by τ . τ can take the value of 0 (current events) up to 3 (events
three months ago).
We estimate equation 1 using probit. The key explanatory variable only varies at a
month-to-month level. As such, the same number of battle deaths in month t applies to
all individual court cases i that reached a verdict in month t. To account for the potential
correlation of model errors for individual court cases within a month, we cluster the standard
errors at a year-month level.
Prior to conducting the empirical analysis we would like to address the concern regarding
the potential endogenous assignment of judges to particular cases. In general, it is reasonable
to assume that the assignment of judges should be completely orthogonal to external events
such as battle deaths, bombing raids and football matches. Reassigning a judge to a different
case still required a number of bureaucratic steps. This suggests that reassignments are
relatively costly and take substantial time.
However, there is still the possibility that assignment is not random and this can bias the
estimates where we use the judge variables as interaction terms. As discussed in Geerling et
al. (2017), the shifting allocation of cases and judges across senates meant that there was
de facto randomization, in which judges heard a variety of cases against defendants with
different characteristics. There are different methods to formally test for randomization.
Some studies conduct an F-test or chi-squared test for independence between key defendant
characteristics and judge assignment (see, for example, Lim et al., 2016). However, Abrams
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et al. (2012) point out that the asymptotic chi-square or F-distribution is inappropriate for
testing for randomization across judges in datasets such as ours because of the small number
of observations at the level at which randomization occurs. Specifically, as Abrams et al.
(2012) note, use of the asymptotic chi-square or F-distribution is likely to over-reject the null
hypothesis of random assignment for two reasons. First, for many defendant characteristics,
the mean is substantially different than 0.5. Second, while the overall sample is large,
regressions suffer from finite-sample bias because sample cells are small within the short
time periods that are relevant. Following the approach suggested by Abrams et al. (2012),
Geerling et al. (2017) address this problem by applying a Monte Carlo methodology to the
same sample of cases/defendants that we employ to explicitly construct a counterfactual
in which each defendant characteristic has the same impact on the likelihood of receiving
the death sentence for all judges. Their results suggest that across each of the defendant
characteristics for which we control that assignment to judges within a given senate and
given year was indeed random.
4.2 Results
Table 2 presents the baseline estimates of the effect of German Wehrmacht battle deaths on
the likelihood that a court ruling would be the death penalty. Columns (1) to (4) increase
the lag from current values to the third lag of the battle death variable, Log(BattleDeaths),
respectively. The specifications include a linear time trend and month-of-the-year dummies.
The coefficient of Log(BattleDeaths) is positive for the current and the lagged values. It is
statistically significant for the current (at the 10%-level), the second lag (1%-level), and the
third lag (5%-level).
Overall, given that the choice of the lag structure is an empirical one, as the effect is
most precisely estimated using the second lag of Log(BattleDeaths), we continue with that
variable as our preferred indicator.
Calculating the marginal effect suggests that if the number of battle fatalities double (i.e.
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as a result of major battles), the judges are 5% more likely to choose the death penalty.
In columns (5) to (8) we include the full set of defendant and judge characteristics as
additional control variables.4 Including the additional control variables hardly changes the
estimated coefficients. If anything, the effects become slightly more precisely estimated as
compared to the specifications in columns (1) to (4) .
Table 2 about here
In Table 3 we check whether battle deaths also affect other types of court rulings. There-
fore, we replace death penalty outcome by an indicator variable that switches to one if the
defendant was acquitted and zero otherwise. We find that higher battle deaths decrease the
likelihood of being acquitted.
Table 3 about here
We then proceed with a number of robustness checks. In Table 4 column 1, we es-
timate equation 1 using OLS instead of probit. We use the second lag of battle deaths,
Log(BattleDeaths)t−2, and the full set of controls. The estimated coefficient that can be
directly interpreted as the marginal effect is somewhat smaller than in the case of probit, but
the results are qualitatively the same. Turning our attention to the time aspect of the effect,
we first specify a model that includes an interaction term between Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 and
the linear time trend as an additional regressor. The idea is to analyse if the effect of battle
deaths increases or decreases over time. The results in column (2) show that the estimated
coefficient of the interaction term is negative, but its magnitude is very small. This can be
interpreted as evidence, that the effect of battle deaths on court rulings is relatively constant
over the entire sample period. In a next step, we exclude observations from individual years.
Overall, the results are robust to the exclusion of particular years. The only exception is if
we exclude all trials from 1942. The coefficient is still positive, but the magnitude of the
effect decreases and it is less precisely estimated.
4Appendix Table A1 presents the full results.
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Table 4 about here
In a next step, we examine whether our results are driven by a particular type of offenses
or defendant group. In Table 5, we first exclude cases that dealt with subversion of the armed
forces (column 1), treason only (2), major high treason only (3) and minor high treason only
(4). The magnitude of the effect stays within a very similar range as the main results and
are all highly statistically significant.
We then proceed to exclude cases in which the defendant was a member of the military
(column 5) or a left-wing political cadre (6). Again, our results are robust to the exclusion
of those defendant groups.
Table 5 about here
We now turn our attention to the potential channels through which battle deaths might
affect court rulings. In a first step, we investigate whether the effect differs by judge charac-
teristics. We use a dummy variable labeled Alter Ka¨mpfer that switches to one if the judge
joined the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers Party) before the Nazis came to
power in January 1933 and zero otherwise. This can be considered as a proxy for the judge’s
ideological commitment. The other variable is called Experienced Judge, which is a dummy
that switches to one if the judge was a judge in the Weimar Republic and zero otherwise.
Table 6 presents specifications that includes those two dummy variables as well as re-
spective interaction terms between each of those dummies and our main variable of interest,
Log(BattleDeaths)t−2. The results in column (1) suggest that the effect of battle deaths de-
pends on the level of experience. If anything, more experienced judges seem to be less likely
to apply the death penalty in months following heavy losses on the battlefield. In column
(2) we find a similar pattern for Alte Ka¨mpfer judges. However, this rather surprising result
could be due to the relatively high correlation between being an Experienced Judge and an
Alter Ka¨mpfer (0.57). Therefore, we include both interaction terms in the specification in
column (3). The estimates show that more experienced judges are less affected by the news
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while more ideologically committed judges are more affected by the bad news compared to
the reference group of judges who have neither been Alte Ka¨mpfer nor Experienced Judge.
These results indicate that more experienced judges are less susceptible to the influence of
legally irrelevant events on judicial decision making. In contrast, strong ideological commit-
ment of judges makes them more susceptible to legally irrelevant information.5
Table 6 about here
Many defendants were members of a German or Austrian communist organization and
many of the death sentences were handed down to communists. Given the ideological con-
text, we now investigate whether this subgroup of defendants was in particular affected by
battle deaths. Column 1 in Table 7 presents the baseline results and the coefficient for the
variable communist, a dummy variable that switches to one if the defendant was a member
of a communist organization and zero otherwise. Column 2 includes Log(BattleDeaths)t−2
as well as an interaction term between Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 and communist. The esti-
mated coefficient of Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 is still positive but decreases in magnitude. The
estimated coefficient for the interaction term is around 0.125 and statistically significant,
indicating that communist defendants were even more affected by the bad news effect. Fo-
cusing only on battle deaths from the Eastern front (columns 3 and 4), we do not find a
statistically significant effect on the death penalty.
Table 7 about here
In a further robustness test, we replace the battle death variable with major bombing raids
on German cities. Bombing raids had a major effect on the morale of the German people.
In addition, their exact timing is also orthogonal to the timing of court rulings. The results
5One might also expect that judges who served in WWI, or who had a son or sons who saw active service
in WWII, may be more likely to impose the death penalty in response to news of higher battle fatalities,
but it was not possible to test for this. Unfortunately, we do not have data on whether the judges had sons
who were fighting on the Eastern or Western front or in North Africa during WWII. Moreover, each of the
judges who heard cases in our sample, served in WWI, except for one (Stier). Hence, as such, our reference
group for an interaction term between battle deaths and being a WWI veteran would only include Stier.
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in Table 8 provide further support for our main findings. Defendants are systematically
more likely to receive the death penalty in a month of a major bombing raid as well as the
following months. The magnitude of the effect is also quite large. A major bombing raid in
the same month increases the chance of receiving the death penalty by another 20%-points.
Table 8 about here
One concern is that information about increased German losses, or bombing raids of
German cities, could lead to increased acts of resistance among the German population.
This could, in turn, increase the number of arrests and trials in the People’s Court and
affect the judges’ decision making.
In Table 9 we examine the nexus between battle deaths and bombing raids , arrests, and
the death penalty. We first estimate the effect of battle deaths (upper panel) and bombing
raids (lower panel) on the number of monthly arrests that eventually led to a defendant
appearing in the People’s Court, charged with treason or high treason. Given that the
dependent variable is the count of arrests in each month we apply a negative binomial
estimator. The results in columns 1 to 3 show that higher battle deaths in previous months
significantly increase the number of arrests. We find some positive effect of bombing raids
in the current month on number of arrests, but the coefficient is not statistically significant
at conventional levels.
In the next step we investigate whether the effect of battle deaths and bombing on the
death penalty are the result of changes in arrests. One confounding factor could be that battle
deaths and bombing raids led to the arrest of a selected sub-group of people who differed
from the rest of the defendants by some other unobserved characteristics and who were as
a result more likely to receive the death penalty. Therefore, battle deaths, and bombing
raids in previous months could simply result in a specific type of defendant appearing more
frequently before judges for sentencing.
However, this would only be a concern if the time between arrest and verdict is sufficiently
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low (2-3 months). In the case of the People’s Court, the median time between arrest and
verdict for defendants in our sample was actually almost one year (332 days).
To ensure that our main results are not being driven by the small subset of cases with a
shorter arrest-to-verdict time, we first exclude all cases where the arrest-to-verdict time was
below 120 days. The results in column 4 reveal that excluding those cases does not change
our results. If anything, it improves the precision of the estimates.
In a further robustness test, we include the contemporary value and lags of the monthly
number of arrests as additional controls in our preferred specifications for battle deaths and
bombing raids. Again, the results do not change qualitatively or quantitatively.
Table 9 about here
So far, we have provided empirical support for the idea that negative legally irrelevant
events systematically increase the likelihood of receiving the death penalty. In a next step,
we investigate the effect of positive, legally irrelevant events on the likelihood of receiving
the death penalty. In particular, we look at victories of the German Men’s National Foot-
ball team, on court rulings. National team games were officially suspended during WWII,
as most players joined the armed forces, but a national team was gathered together and
played 35 internationals against Germany’s allies, neutrals and puppet regimes in the period
September 1939-November 1942 (when the last international was played). Playing inter-
national games during war proved a mixed blessing for a regime intent on using football
superiority as a propaganda coup. Germany thrashed Hungary 7-0 in April 1941 to take the
UFWC (Unofficial Football World Championship), but lost 2-1 to Switzerland two weeks
later on Hitler’s birthday. Joseph Goebbels, the regime’s propaganda minister, was furious
at the time, declaring: “definitely no sporting exchanges when the result is the least bit un-
predictable.” (Brown, 2014, p. 63). Germany regained the UFWC in May 1942, thrashing
Hungary 5-3, but lost 3-2 to Sweden in Berlin in September 1942 (a game attended by Adolf
Hitler, who rarely attended football matches). This defeat marked the beginning of the end
for the national football team in Nazi Germany. When the national team lost to Slovakia in
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November 1942, the team was dissolved and its players were sent to the Eastern front, where
most of them perished. (Brown, 2014, p. 65). Considering the importance of those victories
for national pride, we expect that they should have improved the mood of the judges and,
therefore, resulted in more lenient verdicts.
The results in Table 10 provide some tentative evidence that this was actually the case.
Judges were less likely to apply the death penalty in the months after a victory of the
German’s National football team.
Table 10 about here
One controversial interpretation of the role of the People’s Court is that the judges
were supposed to take into account the sentiment of the people. Such an interpretation is
based on circulars from the Ministry of Justice - Richterbriefe or “letters to the judges”-
which supposedly reminded them to take into account the healthy sentiment of the people
when sentencing. To the extent such Richterbriefe had any legal standing, it might be
argued that the ’sentiment of the people’ may be influenced by battle losses and bombing
raids and, hence, such events were not legally irrelevant to sentencing. Caution should be
exercised here, however. Such invocations to follow the people’s will were often little more
than glib rationalizations for the arbitrariness of the regime. Certainly, Nazi judges did not,
nor were they required, to seek out public opinion in implementing sentencing decisions.
As Wachsmann (2004, p. 219) explained: “the judges still retained a significant degree of
independence and it was they who were ultimately responsible for the judgements”.
There are several reasons to think that the effect of battle losses were influencing sentenc-
ing outcomes through their effect on judges’ mood, rather than through the sentiment of the
people. First, the general population knew little about aggregate battle losses, at least in
the immediate aftermath of the battles, although the Nazi elite (including the judges of the
People’s Court) were aware of the losses, as they were compiled and circulated among the
regime’s senior leadership by the German High Command on a monthly basis (Overmans,
2000). Thus, it is unlikely that the effect of battle losses on sentencing was being driven
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by how the judges perceived the sentiment of the people, given the people were generally
unaware of the losses. Second, we show that more experienced judges were less affected by
battle losses. A large literature shows that more experienced people are less affected by
those short-term heuristics (Strough et al., 2013). Third, we have also examined the effect of
bombing raids as another variable that arguably is even more exogenous to sentencing (the
timing was more or less a surprise and therefore orthogonal to anything that went on in the
courts).
As a further check on whether the sentiment of the people had any effect on sentencing
outcomes, we combine our data with district (Kreis)-level data from Voigtla¨nder and Voth
(2012). They demonstrate the existence of considerable variation in the persistence of anti-
Jewish sentiment over centuries in different parts of Germany. In general, one can think that
anti-Jewish sentiment is likely to be highly correlated with the local population’s demand
for a scapegoat in bad times. Invariably, the regime attributed its most critical setbacks
to conspiracies ultimately initiated by international Jewry. Therefore, if the judges on the
People’s Court were taking into account the sentiment of the people, one would expect that
the effect of battle casualties and bombing raids on sentencing outcomes would be stronger
in areas with more anti-Jewish sentiment.
To implement this test, we build interaction terms between Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 and
three proxies for the ideological commitment of the population in the defendant’s Kreis,
respectively. In particular, we use votes for the Nazi Party in 1928, letters to Der Stu¨rmer
(a rabid anti-semitic newspaper which became a central element of the Nazi propoganda
machine), and whether the Kreis witnessed anti-Jewish progroms in 1349 from Voigtla¨nder
and Voth (2012).
The results in Table 11 reveal that there is no systematic difference in sentencing out-
comes for defendants coming from areas with historically more persistent anti-Jewish senti-
ment compared with areas in which historically there had been less anti-Jewish sentiment.
Similarly, when we interact the bombing raid variable with the Kreis-level data we find no
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effect. This result reinforces our argument that the effect of battle losses and bombing raids
on sentencing is channeled through its effect on the judges’ mood.
Table 11 about here
5 Conclusion
Previous studies have shown that legally irrelevant factors can influence case outcomes
(Danzinger et al., 2011; McConnell, 2009; Shayo & Zussman, 2011). We have extended
this literature to examine the effect of German battle fatalities in WWII on whether those
charged with treason and high treason in wartime Nazi Germany received the death penalty.
The sentencing of defendants convicted of treason and high treason in Nazi Germany
provides a unique opportunity to consider the effect of legally irrelevant factors on sentencing
outcomes. The psychology literature has shown that one’s mood can subconsciously affect
one’s evaluation and information processing (see Bagues & Esteve-Volart, 2013; Healy et al.,
2010; Miller, 2013; Shayo & Zussman, 2011). A negative emotional response to an event
in one domain, such as observing an increase in battle losses, which a judge feels powerless
to control, can be expected to affect adversely the judges mood and, as such, influence
decision-making in another domain - sentencing defendants - that the judge can control.
One would expect that this channel for emotions to be particularly strong for judges
sitting in a politicised court, such as the People’s Court, during wartime. While the judges
may not have been able to exact retribution for higher battle losses on the front, on a regular
basis they were sentencing individuals who were charged with crimes against the state. While
those charged with treason and high treason could not be directly responsible for battle losses
in the months preceding their sentencing, it is entirely possible that the outrage that the
judges felt in response to learning of higher fatalities at the front adversely affected how they
viewed defendants appearing before them, charged with offenses against the state.
Our results are consistent with the existence of such a channel. Our main finding is that
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if the number of battle fatalities double, two months later judges are 5 per cent more likely
to impose the death penalty on those convicted of treason and high treason. We find that
the sentencing decisions of more experienced judges are less likely to be affected by battle
deaths, while judges who were more ideologically committed to the regime were more likely
to impose the death penalty in response to higher battle deaths. We also find some evidence
that communist defendants were more likely to receive the death sentence in the months
following higher battle deaths, although this result is not robust if we consider only battle
fatalities from the Eastern front.
The findings for battle deaths on sentencing outcomes are reinforced by results which
show that major allied bombing raids increased the likelihood of being sentenced to death
two months after the raids and a win by the national football team decreased the likelihood
of being sentenced to death two months after the match had been played.
We have posited that the observed effect of external legally irrelevant events on sentencing
occur via the impact of those external events on the judge’s mood. A limitation of the
analysis undertaken in this paper is that, of course, we have not been able to directly
measure the judge’s mood. The findings, nevertheless, are consistent with the existence
of such a channel and do show that legally irrelevant external events can influence judicial
decisions. As such, the findings presented here contribute to the literature which asserts that
judges are susceptible to emotional biases (Danzinger et al., 2011; Guthrie et al., 2001; 2007;
Jones et al., 2013). The results also provide support for the legal realist view of the law
that psychological, political and social factors influence case outcomes (Posner, 1986). More
generally, our results add to the literature suggesting that not only professional decision-
makers, such as judges, but how the general public votes at election time (Bagues & Esteve-
Volart, 2011; Healy et al., 2010; Miller 2013) and even how public opinion is formed (Bang
Peterson et al., 2014) are susceptible to cognitive biases associated with external events.
While our findings are for an historical court, we suspect that judges in contemporary courts
reacting to external threats, such as terrorism, may be subject to the same heuristic biases,
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when sentencing defendants that bring those biases to the fore.6
6A good case in point might be a defendant of the same ethnicity as those behind a recent terrorist attack.
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Figures & Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Death 2,430 0.423 0.494 0.000 1.000
Acquitted 2,430 0.069 0.253 0.000 1.000
BattleDeaths 2,430 91,916 73,782 0.000 348,960
Experienced Judge 2,430 0.522 0.500 0.000 1.000
Alter Ka¨mpfer 2,430 0.451 0.498 0.000 1.000
Communist 2,430 0.691 0.462 0.000 1.000
BombingRaid 2,430 0.054 0.226 0.000 1.000
FootballVictory 901 0.397 0.490 0.000 1.000
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Table 2: Effect of Battle Deaths on Death Penalty
P (Death = 1|X) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(BattleDeaths)t 0.171* 0.148*
(0.092) (0.083)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−1 0.050 0.051*
(0.031) (0.030)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 0.137*** 0.144***
(0.047) (0.048)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−3 0.074** 0.078**
(0.035) (0.036)
Other Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: # of Obs: 2,431. Probit Estimates; Coefficients reported. *** (**, *): significant at
the one (five, ten) percent level. Dep. Variable: Dummy variable that switches to one if the
sentence was the death penalty and zero otherwise. For list of other controls refer to Table A1.
All Specifications include month of the year dummies and a linear time trend. Standard errors
(in parenthesis) are clustered at the year-month level.
Table 3: Effect of Battle Deaths on Being Acquitted
P (Acquitted = 1|X) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(BattleDeaths)t -0.145***
(0.030)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−1 -0.035
(0.023)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 -0.109***
(0.029)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−3 -0.048*
(0.027)
Notes: # of Obs: 2,431. Probit Estimates; Coefficients reported. *** (**, *): significant at
the one (five, ten) percent level. Dep. Variable: Dummy variable that switches to one if the
defendant was acquitted and zero otherwise. All Specifications include all other control variables,
month and locations dummies and a linear time trend. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are
clustered at the year-month level.
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Table 4: Effect of Battle Deaths on Death Penalty Robustness
P (Death = 1|X) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Excluding
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 0.027*** 0.337** 0.135** 0.209** 0.140*** 0.056* 0.134*** 0.148**
(0.008) (0.154) (0.060) (0.085) (0.036) (0.030) (0.044) (0.075)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 -0.009***
×Time (0.003)
Observations 2,430 2,430 2,395 2,310 2,303 1,907 1,769 1,454
Notes: Column (1): OLS. Columns (2)-(8): Probit. Coefficients reported. *** (**, *): sig-
nificant at the one (five, ten) percent level. Dep. Variable: Dummy variable that switches to
one if the sentence was the death penalty and zero otherwise.All Specifications include all other
control variables, month and locations dummies and a linear time trend. Standard errors (in
parenthesis) are clustered at the year-month level.
Table 5: Effect of Battle Deaths on Death Penalty Excluding Different Types of Offenses
and Defendants
P (Death = 1|X) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excluding
Offense Type: Defendant Type:
Military Treason Maj. Treason Min. Treason Military Pol. Cadre
Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 0.144*** 0.139*** 0.127*** 0.135*** 0.139*** 0.172***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.065)
Observations 1,776 2,375 1,355 2,323 2,396 2,236
Notes: Coefficients reported. *** (**, *): significant at the one (five, ten) percent level. Dep.
Variable: Dummy variable that switches to one if the sentence was the death penalty and zero
otherwise. All Specifications include all other control variables, month and locations dummies
and a linear time trend. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the year-month level.
31
Table 6: Battle Deaths, Judge Characteristics, and Court Rulings
P (Death = 1|X) (1) (2) (3)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 0.290*** 0.247*** 0.286***
(0.067) (0.072) (0.070)
Experienced Judge -0.178*** -0.200
× Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 (0.051) (0.136)
Alter Ka¨mpfer -0.131** 0.026
× Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 (0.061) (0.152)
Experienced Judge 2.178*** 0.190 2.412
(0.595) (0.158) (1.563)
Alter Ka¨mpfer 0.119 1.566** -0.165
(0.182) (0.704) (1.728)
Notes: # of Obs: 2,431. Probit Estimates. Coefficients reported. *** (**, *): significant at
the one (five, ten) percent level. Dep. Variable: Dummy variable that switches to one if the
sentence was the death penalty and zero otherwise. All Specifications include all other control
variables, month and location dummies and a linear time trend. Standard errors (in parenthesis)
are clustered at the year-month level.
Table 7: Battle Deaths on the Eastern Front, Defendants Political Affiliation, and Court
Rulings
P (Death = 1|X) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 0.137*** 0.098**
(0.050) (0.046)
Communist 0.125*
× Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 (0.072)
Log(BattleDeathsEast)t−2 -0.083 -0.030
(0.101) (0.162)
Communist -0.037
× Log(BattleDeathsEast)t−2 (0.147)
Communist 0.443*** -0.939 0.873
(0.119) (0.789) (1.627)
Observations 2,431 2,431 2,186 2,186
Notes: Probit estimates; Coefficients reported. *** (**, *): significant at the one (five, ten)
percent level. Dep. Variable: Dummy variable that switches to one if the sentence was the
death penalty and zero otherwise. All Specifications include all other control variables, month
and locations dummies and a linear time trend. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered
at the year-month level.
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Table 8: Bombing Raids and Court Rulings
P (Death = 1|X) (1) (2) (3)
BombingRaidt 0.526**
(0.225)
BombingRaidt−1 0.326
(0.220)
BombingRaidt−2 0.509**
(0.259)
Notes: # of Obs: 2,431. Probit estimates; Coefficients reported. *** (**, *): significant at the
one (five, ten) percent level. Dep. Variable: Dummy variable that switches to one if the sentence
was the death penalty and zero otherwise. All Specifications include all other control variables,
month and locations dummies and a linear time trend. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are
clustered at the year-month level.
33
Table 9: Battle Deaths, Bombings, Arrests and Death Penalty
Arrests P (Death = 1|X)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(BattleDeaths)t 0.030
(0.035)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−1 0.103***
(0.025)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 0.091*** 0.133*** 0.143*** 0.134** 0.129** 0.138**
(0.019) (0.044) (0.051) (0.054) (0.058) (0.063)
Arrestst 0.001
(0.003)
Arrestst−1 -0.237
(0.313)
Arrestst−2 -0.239
(0.313)
Arrestst−3 -0.235
(0.312)
BombingRaidt 0.178 0.649*** 0.541** 0.520** 0.514** 0.510**
(0.156) (0.192) (0.240) (0.222) (0.221) (0.220)
BombingRaidt−1 -0.311
(0.214)
BombingRaidt−2 -0.187
(0.216)
Arrestst 0.002
(0.003)
Arrestst−1 -0.278
(0.325)
Arrestst−2 -0.285
(0.325)
Arrestst−3 -0.283
(0.325)
Obs. 64 64 64 2,265 2,341 2,329 2,319 2,311
Notes: Probit Estimates; Coefficients reported. *** (**, *): significant at the one (five, ten)
percent level. Dep. Variable: Dummy variable that switches to one if the sentence was the
death penalty and zero otherwise. For list of other controls refer to Table A1. All Specifications
include month of the year dummies and a linear time trend. Standard errors (in parenthesis)
are clustered at the year-month level.
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Table 10: German Men’s National Football Team Victories and Court Rulings
P (Death = 1|X) (1) (2) (3)
FootballV ictoryt -0.023
(0.235)
FootballV ictoryt−1 0.283
(0.222)
FootballV ictoryt−2 -0.512**
(0.234)
Notes: # of Obs: 901. Probit estimates; Coefficients reported. *** (**, *): significant at the
one (five, ten) percent level. Dep. Variable: Dummy variable that switches to one if the sentence
was the death penalty and zero otherwise. All Specifications include all other control variables,
month and locations dummies and a linear time trend. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are
clustered at the year-month level.
Table 11: Battle Deaths, Volkszorn, and Court Rulings
P (Death = 1|X) (1) (2) (3)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 0.116* 0.119** 0.124***
(0.065) (0.052) (0.047)
Votes for NSDAP 1928 0.733
× Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 (2.725)
Votes for NSDAP 1928 -7.495
(31.939)
Stu¨rmer Letters 0.006
× Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 (0.005)
Stu¨rmer Letters 0.029
(0.034)
Pogrom in 1349 -0.001
× Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 (0.103)
Pogrom in 1349 0.207
(1.174)
Observations 791 791 787
Notes: # of Obs: 2,431. Probit estimates; Coefficients reported. *** (**, *): significant at the
one (five, ten) percent level. Dep. Variable: Dummy variable that switches to one if the sentence
was the death penalty and zero otherwise. All Specifications include all other control variables,
month and locations dummies and a linear time trend. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are
clustered at the year-month level.
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Table A1: Effect of Battle Deaths on Death Penalty - Full Results
P (Death = 1|X) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(BattleDeaths)t 0.171* 0.148*
(0.092) (0.083)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−1 0.050 0.051*
(0.031) (0.030)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−2 0.137*** 0.144***
(0.047) (0.048)
Log(BattleDeaths)t−3 0.074** 0.078**
(0.035) (0.036)
Age 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.676*** 0.672*** 0.664*** 0.665***
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
Unemployed -0.188 -0.428 -0.342 -0.330
(0.367) (0.312) (0.332) (0.306)
Education 0.049 0.054 0.062 0.058
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042)
Partial Jewish 0.073 0.088 0.082 0.089
Ancestry (0.288) (0.293) (0.294) (0.293)
Juvenile -0.560 -0.546 -0.558 -0.542
(0.454) (0.451) (0.455) (0.444)
Catholic -0.484*** -0.485*** -0.493*** -0.495***
(0.133) (0.133) (0.132) (0.132)
Foreigner 0.248* 0.299* 0.241 0.321*
(0.146) (0.158) (0.152) (0.167)
Judge Age 0.309** 0.324** 0.326** 0.321**
(0.140) (0.140) (0.138) (0.139)
Judge Age2 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Judge 0.148 0.115 0.160 0.133
Weimar (0.161) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160)
Alter 0.152 0.192 0.163 0.173
Ka¨mpfer (0.177) (0.180) (0.180) (0.180)
Judge -0.766 -0.749 -0.806 -0.796
Catholic (0.755) (0.749) (0.745) (0.737)
Location dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,430 2,430 2,430 2,430 2,430 2,430 2,430 2,430
Notes: Coefficients reported. *** (**, *): significant at the one (five, ten) percent level. Dep. Variable: Dummy variable
that switches to one if the sentence was the death penalty and zero otherwise. All Specifications include month of the year
dummies and a linear time trend. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the year-month level.
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